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FOR RICHER, NOT POORER:  
PREMARITAL WAIVERS OF SPOUSAL 
SUPPORT IN CALIFORNIA 
J. Nicholas Marfori* 
          California law is fairly straightforward with respect 
to premarital agreements that seek to alter community 
property rights in the event of a divorce. But it is unclear 
and unsettled with respect to those agreements that seek to 
limit or waive spousal support. Although California 
prohibits courts from enforcing premarital waivers of 
spousal support if it would be unconscionable to do so at 
the time of enforcements, courts have not articulated a clear 
standard for what that means. California made its first 
attempt to do so in In re Marriage of Facter. This Article 
considers that decision in illustrating how current law, 
which does not clearly define unconscionability, allows 
courts to arbitrarily decide when such a waiver is fair. This 
Article argues that, instead, courts must consider the 
balance between freedom of contract and public policy 
embodied in the California Family Code. Finally, this 
Article concludes by proposing a set of policy-based 
guidelines that courts and the legislature can consider in 
determining the enforceability of such waivers under 
existing law.  
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to Professor Jan C. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
California law has evolved to become fairly straightforward with 
regard to premarital agreements1 that seek to alter community 
property rights in the event of divorce.2 Prospective spouses are 
generally free to decide which spouse would get the house, the car, 
the dog, etc., if the marriage were to end in dissolution.3 What 
remains unclear and unsettled, however, in California premarital 
agreement law, is the enforceability of those provisions that seek to 
limit or waive spousal support4 upon dissolution of marriage.5 
Section 1612(c) of the California Family Code6 prohibits 
enforcement of premarital waivers of spousal support if it would be 
“unconscionable at the time of enforcement,”7 but courts have yet to 
articulate a clear standard for what that actually means. To illustrate, 
suppose George and Jane decide to get married in anticipation of 
having a child. Concerned about the wealth he had accumulated over 
the years (and Jane’s lack thereof), George conditions the marriage 
 
 1. A premarital agreement, also referred to as a prenuptial agreement, is “[a]n agreement 
made before marriage [usually] to resolve issues of support and property division if the marriage 
ends in divorce or by the death of a spouse.” Prenuptial Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 2. California law “freely permits contractual variation of the community property regime.” 
GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 68 (6th ed. 2012); see also 
Pre-Marital Agreements: Hearing on SB 78 Before the Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2001–
02 Reg. Sess. 4–5 (Cal. 2001), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/ 
sb_78_cfa_20010625_102529_asm_comm.html [hereinafter Hearing on SB 78] (For over 150 
years, “California has recognized the right of parties to agree to marriage terms at variance with 
[community property] law through pre-marital agreements.”).  
 3. See Fahi Takesh Hallin, Strategies for Successfully Representing California Clients and 
Overcoming Challenges in Family Law Cases, in STRATEGIES FOR FAMILY LAW IN CALIFORNIA: 
LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 73 
(2013 ed.) (“Generally, there is no or very little limitation on parties contracting away their right 
to community property during the marriage . . . .”). 
 4. Spousal support, often referred to as maintenance or alimony, and can be defined as “[a] 
court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for maintenance and support 
while they are separated, while they are involved in a matrimonial lawsuit, or after they are 
divorced.” Alimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The duty to support one’s spouse 
is statutory. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4300 (West 2014). 
 5. See Steve Mindel, Succeeding As a California Family Law Practitioner, in STRATEGIES 
FOR FAMILY LAW IN CALIFORNIA: LEADING LAWYERS ON UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN 
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 71 (2014 ed.) (Advising family law practitioners to “warn clients that 
any modification of spousal support rights remain an unsettled area in family law, and the 
drafting of premarital agreements should be approached with caution.”); Hallin, supra note 3, at 
73 (recognizing that “the issue of whether or not a waiver of spousal support in a prenuptial 
agreement will be valid has been a very hot topic in California for many years.”). 
 6. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Family Code in this Article refer to the 
California Family Code. 
 7. FAM. § 1612(c). 
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on her signing a premarital agreement that requires her to waive any 
right to spousal support if they ever divorced, but also provides for 
her to receive $200,000 in lump sum, their Caribbean timeshare, and 
their million-dollar marital home to which she made no financial 
contribution. Jane agrees. Shortly after the wedding, she quits her 
retail job to be a stay-at-home mom, leaving George financially 
responsible for Jane, their son, and Jane’s daughter from a previous 
marriage. After fifteen years, they separate. 
During the divorce proceedings, Jane asks the court for post-
dissolution spousal support. She admits that she freely and 
voluntarily waived her right to spousal support in their premarital 
agreement, but she claims that enforcing that waiver would be 
unconscionable under section 1612(c). How should the court rule? 
Would it be it unconscionable to deny her spousal support, when she 
would still receive $200,000, a Caribbean timeshare, and their 
million-dollar home? Does it matter that Jane has not worked in 
fifteen years, while George makes over $1 million per year? What if 
George makes only $500,000 per year? What if George lost his job 
during the marriage? Would it matter if their marriage lasted only 
fifteen weeks instead of fifteen years?  
In In re Marriage of Facter,8 the California Court of Appeal 
made its first attempt to delineate the circumstances in which 
enforcement of a premarital waiver of spousal support would be 
unconscionable. There, Nancy Facter waived her right to spousal 
support in a premarital agreement.9 In deciding whether or not to 
enforce the waiver, the court noted that Nancy was entitled to receive 
$200,000, a Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent interest in their 
marital home from her ex-husband.10 Nevertheless, the court found 
that “[c]ompared to what she is likely to receive in court-ordered 
spousal support, these assets [were] manifestly inadequate.”11 The 
court had “little difficulty” concluding that the spousal support 
waiver was unconscionable, given that her ex-husband Jeffrey was 
 
 8. 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 9. Id. at 84–85. Paragraph No. 3 of the Property Rights section of the agreement stated that 
Paragraph No. 2 would “constitute [Nancy’s] sole right to property acquired during marriage and 
to support . . . .” Id. at 83–84. Paragraph No. 6 in the Child Support section of the agreement 
provided that “nothing in his conditional . . . ‘shall give rise to any other obligations to pay of the 
housing of [Nancy], spousal support, or additional sums of child support.’” Id. at 83. 
 10. Id. at 93. 
 11. Id.  
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worth over $10 million with earnings of $1 million per year, while 
Nancy had no separate property and no income coming out of the 
marriage.12 Said succinctly, the court decided that Nancy deserved 
more and that Jeffrey could pay more. 
To be clear, this Article does not suggest that the Court of 
Appeals was wrong (or right) in finding that the waiver in Facter 
was unconscionable. Nor does it probe for some mathematical 
formula to determine unconscionability. Instead, this Article seeks to 
address several important questions that have remained unanswered 
since the enactment of Family Code section 1612(c) and continue to 
remain unanswered even after Facter. For instance, what is the 
standard for determining whether a spousal support waiver is 
unconscionable at the time of enforcement? Is the waiver 
unconscionable simply because it later turns out to be unfair? Should 
spousal support waivers be treated as any other type of contractual 
waiver with regard to unconscionability? Perhaps the broader inquiry 
underlying these questions is whether the courts, through this 
unconscionability approach, should be able to invalidate a premarital 
contract term when they find it to be more favorable to one party 
over the other, and if so, why? 
Part II of this Article explores the historical development of 
California law on premarital waivers of spousal support. Part III 
takes a closer look at Facter to illustrate how the current law 
precluding enforcement of spousal support waivers found to be 
unconscionable, without a clear standard for determining 
unconscionability, allows courts to arbitrarily evaluate the 
substantive fairness of such waivers. Drawing upon contract law 
principles and policy considerations that arise when prospective 
spouses attempt to modify their legal obligations under marriage, 
Part IV argues that a court’s unconscionability determination must 
consider the delicate balance between freedom of contract and public 
policy embodied in section 1612(c) of the Family Code. Part V 
explains why the spousal support waiver provision in the recently 
promulgated Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act of 
201213 fails to strike such a balance, and proposes a set of policy-
based guidelines for judicial or legislative consideration regarding 
the enforceability of such waivers under the existing law. 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, 9C U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2014). 
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II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA LAW ON  
SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAIVERS 
Premarital agreements have long been used to delineate the 
property rights between spouses during the marriage14 and to 
regulate the disposition of property upon the death of one of the 
spouses.15 In the 1970s, as the number of divorces increased in the 
advent of “no-fault” divorce legislation and changing attitudes 
towards marriage, California courts began recognizing and enforcing 
premarital agreements in contemplation of divorce.16 With regard to 
property rights, spouses were freely permitted to “agree to marriage 
terms at variance with [community property] law . . . unless they 
violated general contractual concepts of fraud, duress, or undue 
influence, or otherwise were contrary to public policy.”17 Yet during 
that time, courts remained hesitant to enforce provisions waiving or 
limiting spousal support due to public policy concerns against 
promoting divorce.18 
A.  Early Case Law on Spousal Support Waivers 
The first major decision in California involving spousal support 
waivers rested heavily on public policy concerns. In In re Marriage 
of Higgason,19 decided in 1973, a husband and wife entered into a 
premarital agreement in which each spouse waived “any and all right 
 
 14. See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 67 (“To insulate daughters from the operation of the 
[English] common law, wealthy English families created trusts for a wife’s separate benefit and 
negotiated premarital contracts that gave a wife control of her property during marriage.”). 
 15. Id. (“[P]remarital agreements have served the needs of older persons, often widows and 
widowers, who wish to remarry but also to safeguard the family patrimony for the children of a 
prior marriage. Originally, such contracts regulated the disposition of property upon the death of 
one of the parties.”). Such agreements were once “regarded with distrust and hostility” for being 
within “the province of the wealthy, the age disparate, the heartless, or the simply greedy.” 
Allison Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
887, 888 (1998); see also Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 4–5 (“[Premarital] agreements 
normally have been considered enforceable unless they violated general contractual concepts of 
fraud, duress, or undue influence, or otherwise were contrary to public policy.”). 
 16. CHARLOTTE K. GOLDBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY 69 (2014); see also BLUMBERG, 
supra note 2, at 68 (“As the frequency of divorces increased, attorneys began to insert divorce 
provisions in premarital agreements.”); Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5 (“As economic 
conditions, attitudes toward marriage, and views on the status of men and women changed over 
the latter half of the twentieth century, the use of pre-marital agreements also has increased.”). 
 17. Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5. 
 18. Michelle Butler, Part Two: Alimony and the Marriage Contract: California Premarital 
Agreements Waiving or Specifying Spousal Support Obligations, 20 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
41, 41 (2009).  
 19. 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973) disapproved by In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 327 
(Cal. 1976). 
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for contribution to the support, maintenance and expenses of the 
other party.”20 At the time they were married, the wife was a 
seventy-three-year-old woman with “substantial assets,” whereas the 
husband, at forty-eight, was “earning $2 an hour plus tips, and had 
little or no means.”21 About halfway through their two-year 
marriage, the husband began incurring substantial medical and 
hospitalization costs after being beaten by an unknown assailant, 
having a lung surgically removed due to lung cancer, and suffering a 
heart attack that left him disabled.22 The trial court denied the 
husband’s request for temporary spousal support of $2,500 per 
month and other post-dissolution financial benefits based on its 
conclusion that the premarital agreement precluded him from 
receiving such support.23 
The California Supreme Court remanded, holding that the 
premarital agreement was void against public policy and, therefore, 
did not preclude the court from awarding support to the husband.24 
Recognizing a distinction between agreements relating to the 
disposition of property and those that seek to “vary the personal 
duties and obligations to each other which result from the marriage 
contract itself,”25 the court articulated the bright line rule that “[a]ny 
attempt by the parties to diminish or waive this obligation in an 
antenuptial agreement is unenforceable.”26 The court reasoned that 
because contracts containing spousal support waivers would 
“facilitate divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in 
the event of such an occurrence,” such contracts would not be “in 
contemplation that marriage relation will continue until the parties 
are separated by death” and would, therefore, be void against public 
policy.27 
Shortly thereafter, in In re Marriage of Dawley,28 the California 
Supreme Court revisited its ruling in Higgason when it upheld the 
validity of a premarital agreement in which the parties, both of whom 
planned the early dissolution of their marriage, agreed to keep their 
 
 20. Id. at 290–91. 
 21. Id. at 290. 
 22. Id. at 291. 
 23. Id. at 292–93. 
 24. See id. at 295–98. 
 25. Id. at 296. 
 26. Id. at 295. 
 27. Id. 
 28. 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976). 
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earnings and other property acquired during marriage as separate 
property.29 In her request for court-ordered support, the wife relied 
on Higgason to argue that the premarital agreement as a whole was 
invalid as against public policy because it was not “made in 
contemplation that the marriage relation will continue until the 
parties are separated by death.”30 The court disagreed, however, 
clarifying that a premarital agreement “violates state policy favoring 
marriage only insofar as its terms encourage or promote dissolution,” 
and that the parties’ anticipation of an early termination of their 
marriage was irrelevant to the enforceability of the agreement.31 
Finding that the spousal support provision neither waived nor limited 
financial support to the wife, but instead guaranteed her a minimum 
amount of support, the court held that the agreement did not violate 
public policy and was therefore enforceable.32 
B.  The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Pendleton 
When it first codified statutory law regarding premarital 
agreements, the California Legislature contemplated the prevailing 
public policy against contractual limitation of spousal support 
articulated in Higgason and Dawley.33 In 1985, California became 
the first state to adopt the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
(UPAA),34 which was promulgated by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to address the “substantial 
uncertainty as to the enforceability . . . of [premarital] agreements 
and [the] significant lack of uniformity of treatment of these 
agreements among the states.”35 When bill was first proposed in the 
California State Senate, it contained all sections of the model code 
almost word for word.36 However, after considering testimony in 
opposition of the UPAA sections regarding spousal support, the bill 
was enacted without the provisions that allowed for premarital 
 
 29. Id. at 325. 
 30. Id. at 325. 
 31. Id. at 329–30. 
 32. Id. at 331. 
 33. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 2 (at the time of enactment of the Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act, “California case law considered the waiver of spousal support to be 
void as against public policy, because public policy favored the protection of marriage and the 
waiver of spousal support was believed to encourage dissolution.”). 
 34. Charlotte K. Goldberg, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”: Premarital Agreements and 
Spousal Support Waivers in California, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2000). 
 35. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 36 (1983). 
 36. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5. 
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modification or elimination of spousal support.37 
The California Legislature explained that by deleting the two 
spousal support provisions from its version of the UPAA, “California 
case law would continue to prevail on the issue of spousal support in 
premarital agreements.”38 Some commentators understood that, by 
omitting those provisions, the Legislature “intended to preclude 
predetermination of spousal support upon divorce” as against public 
policy in favor of marriage.39 Others, however, viewed that the 
Legislature’s omission of the support provisions left open the 
question of whether the courts should continue to follow prior case 
law (Higgason and Dawley) on the enforceability of spousal support 
waivers, or whether the Act should be read to allow the courts 
discretion in allowing or prohibiting such waivers.40 The Supreme 
Court took fifteen years to address this issue in its decision in  
Fifteen years later, in In re Marriage of Pendleton,41 the 
California Supreme Court recognized that “changes in the law 
governing the spousal relation warrant[ed] the reexamination of the 
assumptions and policy underlying the refusal to enforce waivers of 
spousal support.”42 In Pendleton, a husband and wife, each of whom 
had considerable assets to their name and elevated earning capacities 
at the time of dissolution,43 entered into a premarital agreement in 
which they each waived “all rights to any type of spousal support or 
 
 37. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983) (“Parties to a 
premarital agreement may contract with respect to . . . the modification or elimination of spousal 
support.”). But see Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5 (“After hearing testimony opposing the 
bill’s waiver provisions on several grounds . . . the Legislature deleted the two provisions 
permitting waiver of spousal support before enacting the rest of the UPAA into law.”); Butler, 
supra note 18, at 42 n.6 (“[O]pposition from the Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles 
and others led the Family Law Section [of the California State Bar] to condition its support [of 
the bill] on the elimination of the provision allowing the waiver of spousal support.”). 
 38. Butler, supra note 18, at 42 (quoting ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON SB 1143, S.B. 1143, 1985–86 Reg. Sess., at 3 (1985)). 
 39. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1253; see also Robert H. Martin, Waivers of Spousal 
Support in Premarital Agreements, 1 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 475, 487 (1993) (“The legislature has 
spoken. And the California courts have made clear their intentions. In California, the courts will 
continue to apply case law and will hold waivers of spousal support void as against public 
policy.”). 
 40. Butler, supra note 18, at 42–43. 
 41. 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000). 
 42. Id. at 845. 
 43. Id. at 840. At the time of their divorce, each spouse was worth approximately $2.5 
million. The husband held a doctorate in pharmacology and a law degree, while the wife held a 
master’s degree and was earning $5,772 per month in Social Security benefits, investment 
returns, and rental income. Id. 
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child support from the other” in the event of divorce.44 Both parties, 
represented by independent counsel in the negotiation and 
preparation of the agreement, understood its legal consequences and 
executed it freely and voluntarily.45 
Despite having satisfied the statutory procedural requirements, 
the trial court found the waiver to be void as against public policy, 
and it ordered the husband to pay temporary spousal support of 
$8,500 per month.46 The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded on 
the ground that “the current state of family law is one that ‘should 
not per se prohibit premarital spousal support waivers or 
limitations.’”47 The California Supreme Court agreed, concluding 
that: 
[N]o public policy is violated by permitting enforcement of 
a waiver of spousal support executed by intelligent, well-
educated persons, each of whom appears to be self-
sufficient in property and earning ability, and both of whom 
have the advice of counsel regarding their rights and 
obligations as marital partners at the time they execute the 
waiver.48  
Noting that section 1612(a)(7) of the Family Code expressly 
permits premarital agreements as to “any other matter, including 
their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public 
policy,”49 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.50 
In the majority opinion, Justice Baxter noted that the California 
version of the UPAA, as it was introduced, contained provisions that 
would have permitted waivers of spousal support but were 
subsequently deleted by amendment.51 In his view, the omission of 
 
 44. The spousal support waiver was worded as follows: “[B]oth parties now and forever 
waive, in the event of a dissolution of the marriage, all rights to any type of spousal support . . . 
from the other.” Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 840–41 (explaining that in determining the amount of support to be ordered, the 
court took note of the couple’s “$20,000 to $32,000 per month” lifestyle). 
 47. Id. at 841 (quoting In re Marriage of Pendleton, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (Ct. App. 
1998), aff’d, 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000)). 
 48. Id. at 848. 
 49. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(7) (stating that in addition to those subject matters expressly 
enumerated in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(6), “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract 
with respect to . . . [a]ny other matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in 
violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty”). 
 50. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 849. 
 51. Id. 849–50. 
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those provisions evinced the Legislature’s intention to “leave the law 
as it was in 1985,” but he found it to be “unreasonable to assume that 
the Legislature intended the common law of the 19th century to 
govern the marital relationship in the 21st century.”52 Justice Baxter 
understood the Legislature to have been “satisfied with the evolution 
of the common law governing premarital waivers of spousal support 
and intended that evolution to continue.”53 In light of that 
interpretation, the court found that “the common law policy, based 
on assumptions that dissolution of marriage is contrary to public 
policy and that premarital waivers of spousal support may promote 
dissolution, [was] anachronistic.”54 
The Pendleton court took a significant step towards the 
common-law recognition of spousal support waivers by overruling 
Higgason, but it also called for legislative action on the matter. In its 
opinion, the majority expressly invited the Legislature to impose 
limitations on the right to waive spousal support and/or to specify the 
circumstances in which enforcement of a waiver would be unjust.55 
Less than one year later, the invitation was accepted.56 
C.  The Pendulum Swings After Pendleton 
In 2001, Senate Bill 78 amended section 1612 of the Family 
Code to expressly permit premarital waivers of spousal support. As it 
was introduced, however, the bill contained language to prohibit 
such waivers, which the author intended to operate as a direct 
legislative response to nullify the Pendleton holding.57 According to 
the author of the bill, the Pendleton court “fundamentally 
 
 52. Id. (explaining that the “common law of the 19th century” imposed a blanket prohibition 
against premarital waivers of spousal support because such waivers were found to encourage 
divorce); see In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 295 (Cal. 1973); Barham v. Barham, 202 
P.2d 289 (Cal. 1949); Whiting v. Whiting, 216 P. 92 (Cal. 1923). 
 53. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 845. 
 54. Id. at 845. 
 55. Id. at 839 n.12 (“The Legislature may, of course, limit the right to enter into premarital 
waivers of spousal support and/or specify the circumstances in which enforcement should be 
denied.”). 
 56. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5. 
 57. Id. (“[T]he right of a child or a spouse to support may not be adversely affected by a 
premarital agreement.”) (emphasis omitted). The bill was also proposed in response the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Bonds, which held that the lack of representation 
by independent counsel at the execution of a premarital agreement was only one factor in 
determining voluntariness of a premarital agreement. 5 P.3d 815, 828 (Cal. 2000). However, this 
Article focuses specifically on spousal support waivers and the court’s evaluation of substantive 
fairness thereof at the time of enforcement. 
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misinterpreted the Legislature’s intent” in omitting the spousal 
support provisions from its version of the UPAA.58 But after the bill 
met opposition from various organizations and individuals,59 an 
amended version was proposed that allowed enforcement of such 
waivers on a case-by-case basis so long as certain conditions were 
met; the amended version passed almost unanimously.60 As it was 
ultimately enacted, the support provision of Senate Bill 78—now 
codified in subsection (c) of Family Code section 1612—provides: 
Any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal 
support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not 
enforceable if the party against whom enforcement of the 
spousal support provision is sought was not represented by 
independent counsel at the time the agreement containing 
the provision was signed, or if the provision regarding 
spousal support is unconscionable at the time of 
enforcement.61 
Although the bill as enacted did not prohibit waivers of spousal 
support as its author originally intended, it created two obstacles for 
those seeking to enforce such waivers in court.62 The first part of the 
rule, which requires representation by independent counsel at the 
time of signing, operates as a procedural safeguard to ensure 
voluntariness at the time of execution of the waiver. The second part, 
however, is substantive in nature in that it expressly prohibits 
enforcement of waivers that are shown to be unconscionable at the 
time of enforcement.63 
This Article centers on the unconscionability standard set forth 
 
 58. Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 5. 
 59. Id. at 6 (explaining that the bill, as introduced, met opposition from the Coalition of 
Parent Support and other individuals who argued that a statutory prohibition on spousal support 
waivers is “paternalistic, demeans adult women who should be able to enter a premarital 
agreement as freely as any other contract, discourages second marriages by men already carrying 
an unfair spousal support burden, and is contrary to the laws of 40 other states and the District of 
Columbia”). 
 60. Complete Bill History, S.B. 78, 2001–02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), http://www.leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_78_bill_20010912_history.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2015) (detailing that the bill was passed with thirty-nine ayes to zero noes in the Senate, and 
sixty-one ayes to six noes in the assembly). 
 61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014). 
 62. See also John G. Gherini, The California Supreme Court Swings and Misses in Defining 
the Scope and Enforceability of Premarital Agreements, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 151, 171 (2001) 
(explaining that the amendment “adds significant protections to a party who benefits from spousal 
support”). 
 63. FAM. § 1612(c). 
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in the second part of the rule because, as illustrated in In re Marriage 
Facter,64 this standard gives courts significant discretion in 
evaluating the substantive fairness of spousal support waivers.65 
Furthermore, it allows courts to determine the enforceability of a 
waiver by considering the circumstances existing at the time the 
waiver is to be enforced, as opposed to the time of its execution.66 
III.  IN RE MARRIAGE OF FACTER: PAINTING A PICTURE OF THE 
UNCONSCIONABLE WAIVER 
The enactment of Senate Bill 78 amended California law to 
provide, among other things, that “[a]ny provision in a premarital 
agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a 
waiver of it, is not enforceable . . . if the provision regarding spousal 
support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.”67 In In re 
Marriage of Facter, the California Court of Appeal made its first 
attempt to paint a picture of what an unconscionable waiver of 
spousal support looks like at the time of enforcement.68 As one 
practitioner noted, In re Marriage of Facter is “the most remarkable 
case involving premarital agreements to come along in over a 
decade, and the family law bench and bar are going to be dealing 
with the fallout from it for years to come.”69 
A.  The Agreement, the Disagreement, and the Decision 
When Nancy met Jeffrey in 1990, she had a part-time job selling 
shoes at Nordstrom, and Jeffrey was a partner at a law firm.70 Jeffrey 
was a Harvard graduate; Nancy had a high school diploma.71 Jeffrey 
 
 64. 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 (Ct. App. 2013). For a discussion of Facter, see infra, Part III. 
 65. See Butler, supra note 18, at 46 (“In determining which support arrangements are 
‘unconscionable’ at the time of divorce, the legislature seems to have relegated considerable 
space to common-law development and treatment of these agreements.”). 
 66. This type of provision has been referred to as a “second-look” provision. DAVID 
WESTFALL ET AL., ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION § 11.05(1)(a)(i) (4th ed. 2014). 
 67. FAM. § 1612(c). 
 68. Id. at 79. Although it is of no significant consequence to this analysis, it is important to 
note that the Facter court did not directly refer to Family Code section 1612(c) when it made its 
ruling on unconscionability, but instead referred to the language from Pendleton. Id. This is 
because the statute does not apply retroactively to premarital agreements executed before the 
statute was enacted. See In re Marriage of Rosendale, 115 P. 3d 417 (Cal. 2005); In re Marriage 
of Howell, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 69. Brian J. Kramer, Dealing with the Fallout from In re Marriage of Facter, BRIAN J. 
KRAMER P.C. FAMILY LAW (Sept. 23, 2013), http://bjkpc.com/2/featured-blog/. 
 70. In re Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 86. 
 71. Id. at 92. 
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began providing financial support for Nancy as their relationship 
progressed.72 He bought her a used car and financed her real estate 
licensing course.73 When Nancy stopped working, Jeffrey became 
solely responsible for the living expenses of Nancy and her two 
children from a prior marriage.74 When they purchased their home in 
Mill Valley, they took title in joint tenancy, even though Nancy did 
not contribute any money towards the purchase.75 
The couple decided to get married in contemplation of having 
their first child together.76 According to Nancy, “Jeffrey wanted to 
have a child but Nancy told him she would not do so outside of 
marriage.”77 Nancy had already been involved in divorce litigation 
with her prior husband78 that included disputes regarding support and 
attorney fees;79 she was familiar with “laws on community property, 
support, and support arrearages.”80 Jeffrey expressed to Nancy his 
concern about protecting his earnings and conditioned the marriage 
on her signing a premarital agreement, which he would prepare 
himself.81  
On November 7, 1994, the day before their wedding, Jeffrey and 
Nancy entered into a premarital agreement (the “Agreement”).82 The 
Agreement declared that Jeffrey’s separate property (valued at 
approximately $3 million at the time) and his earnings of between 
$475,000 and $700,000 before the marriage, were to be kept out of 
Nancy’s reach.83 Also, because the Agreement opted out of 
community property rights, all property acquired during marriage by 
each spouse would be his or her own separate property.84 In the 
event of divorce or permanent separation, however, Jeffrey promised 
to give Nancy $100,000 up front, and an additional $100,000 if the 
 
 72. Id. at 84. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 86. 
 76. See id. at 85. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 86. 
 79. Id. at 86 n.11. 
 80. Id. at 86. 
 81. Id. at 85 (“[Jeffrey] told [Nancy] he was afraid of marriage because he had worked hard 
all his life, had earned a lot of money, and wanted all that he had earned prior to marriage to be 
protected.”). 
 82. Id. at 83 (“The parties married the day after they signed the Agreement.”). 
 83. Id. at 82. 
 84. See id. 
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marriage lasted at least fifteen years and if he was a partner at his 
firm for more than seven years during the marriage.85 Nancy was 
also to receive at divorce half of the value of the marital estate (after 
reimbursement of the down payment, costs, fees and taxes to 
Jeffrey), all of the home’s furnishings, and the Jaguar automobile.86 
The Agreement also contained a waiver of spousal support.87 
The couple separated after sixteen years of marriage.88 In her 
motion for temporary support and attorney fees, Nancy argued that 
the document did not contain a spousal support waiver.89 Jeffrey 
opposed, relying on two provisions to argue that a spousal support 
waiver was contemplated in the agreement: (1) the provision that his 
promise to continue paying the mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the 
marital home “shall [not] give rise to any other obligations to pay for 
the housing of [Nancy], spousal support, or additional sums for child 
support”; (2) the provision stating that the assets enumerated in 
Paragraph No. 2 “constitute [Nancy’s] sole right to property acquired 
during the marriage and to support.”90 The trial court granted 
Nancy’s motion for temporary support and attorney fees and costs, 
and in response, Jeffrey abandoned his efforts to enforce the spousal 
support waiver.91 Jeffrey instead focused his argument on the 
severability clause in the Agreement, which would require the 
property-related provisions of the Agreement to be honored despite 
the invalid waiver.92 Yet his abandonment of the waiver claim did 
not prevent the trial court from finding the spousal support waiver to 
be unconscionable, and using that finding to invalidate the entire 
agreement as unenforceable.93 
On appeal, the court agreed that the there was an invalid, 
unconscionable waiver of spousal support in the Agreement,94 but it 
 
 85. Id. at 83. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 89. Although there was some dispute as to whether the Agreement actually 
contained a spousal support waiver, the court ultimately found that a spousal support waiver 
existed in Paragraph No. 3 of the Agreement. 
 88. Id. at 82–83. The parties married in 1994 and separated in 2010. 
 89. Id. at 83. 
 90. Id. at 83–84 (second and third alterations in original). 
 91. Id. at 84. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 87–88. 
 94. Id. at 93. Although this Article is narrowly concerned with unconscionability at the time 
of enforcement, it is important to note that the appellate court in Facter also discussed at length 
whether the spousal support waiver was unconscionable at the time of execution based on the 
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found that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the invalid 
provisions.95 In deciding whether the spousal support waiver was 
unconscionable at the time of enforcement, the court acknowledged 
that, under the Agreement, Nancy was already entitled to receive 
$200,000, the Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent interest in their 
marital home.96 Nevertheless, according to Judge Margulies, these 
assets were “manifestly inadequate” when “[c]ompared to what she 
[was] likely to receive in court-ordered spousal support.”97 After all, 
Jeffrey owned separate property valued at $10 million and earned an 
annual income of $1 million per year, while Nancy had neither 
income nor separate property to her name.98 Thus, the court had 
“little difficulty” concluding that the waiver of spousal support was 
unconscionable.99 
B.  The Facter Aftermath 
Although the Facter court identified factual circumstances that 
would make a spousal support waiver unconscionable, it neglected to 
articulate a clear standard from which it decided that those 
circumstances amounted to unconscionability.100 The court simply 
decided that $200,000, a Jaguar automobile, and a fifty-percent 
ownership interest in a multi-million-dollar home was not enough in 
light of Jeffrey’s net worth and annual income.101  
To clarify, this Article does not suggest that Facter was 
incorrectly decided. Nor does it suggest that a monetary imbalance 
between the parties is irrelevant to the inquiry. However, the court’s 
mathematical approach in Facter provides little guidance as to what 
constitutes unconscionability, perhaps because it would be difficult, 
 
circumstances around the time Nancy signed the agreement. See id. at 90–92. Finding that “there 
was a great disparity in the parties’ respective incomes and assets at the time they entered into the 
Agreement” and that a “significant inequality of bargaining power” was evidenced by the fact 
that Jeffrey drafted the Agreement and told Nancy that the spousal support waiver was not 
negotiable, the court concluded that the waiver was unconscionable at the time of execution. See 
id. at 92. 
 95. Id. at 99. 
 96. Id. at 93. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Request for Partial Depublication at 2, In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79 
(Ct. App. 2013) (No. A134191), http://www.walzermelcher.com/articles-prenup/Req-for-Partial-
Depublish.pdf. 
 101. In re Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 93–94 & n.26. 
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if not impossible, to attach a mathematical formula to 
unconscionability. If Jeffrey had promised $500,000 to Nancy 
instead of only $200,000, would the support waiver still be 
unconscionable? What about $700,000? What if he promised her full 
ownership interest in their home rather than only fifty percent? 
The lack of a clear and objective standard for determining 
unconscionability makes it difficult for prospective spouses to 
predict the enforceability of such waivers and leads to unnecessary 
litigation.102 But in a broader sense, the Facter decision illustrates 
the prevailing issue with California’s unconscionability approach on 
spousal support waivers: a rule that bars enforcement of support 
waivers found to be unconscionable at the time of enforcement, 
without proper guidance for determining unconscionability, allows 
courts to arbitrarily evaluate the substantive fairness of such waivers. 
This Article seeks to resolve this issue by proposing a clear and 
objective set of guidelines for determining whether a premarital 
waiver of spousal support is unconscionable at the time of 
enforcement.103 To that end, the following part of this Article 
discusses the contract law principles and policy considerations that 
arise when prospective spouses attempt to waive spousal support 
obligations before marriage. 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY VS. FREEDOM OF MARITAL CONTRACT 
Contractual autonomy often conflicts with public policy 
considerations when prospective spouses attempt to modify or waive 
their legal rights and obligations before marriage.104 Under the 
bargain principle of contracts, “parties should be bound to honor 
agreements to which they truly consented at an earlier time.”105 The 
underlying premise is that “[c]ontracts would not serve their function 
of allocating the risk of future events if the law were to decline 
enforcement of an agreement merely because the future turned out 
 
 102. See Request for Partial Depublication, supra note 100, at 2; Peter M. Walzer, The 
Gender Factor of Marriage of Facter, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 44, 44 (“[A] vague standard as to 
the meaning of the word ‘unconscionability’ will lead to considerable litigation over the 
enforceability of prenups.”). 
 103. See infra Part V.B. 
 104. See Request for Partial Depublication, supra note 100, at 2 (“There is a natural tension 
between freedom of contract and the court’s role in protecting spouses in need of spousal 
support.”). 
 105. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.05 cmt. a 
(2002). 
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less favorably than one of the contracting parties expected.”106 On 
the other hand, however, “social policy seeks to assure a fair 
allocation of the gains and losses when the marriage relationship 
ends.”107 As noted by the California Legislature, “agreements 
between prospective spouses occupy a unique area of law and policy, 
involve emotional relationships far different than those between most 
contracting parties, and thereby merit a unique approach.”108 The 
following sections explain how this unique approach took form in the 
careful balancing of freedom of contract and public policy concerns 
with regard to the ability of prospective spouses to contractually 
modify or waive their legal rights and obligations before marriage. 
A.  Public Policy in Favor of Marriage 
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA)109 has been 
adopted by twenty-six states since its promulgation in 1983;110 
roughly half of those states have made significant amendments.111 
Although, California was the first state to adopt the UPAA in 1985, 
the Legislature omitted the provisions that permitted spousal support 
waivers in premarital agreements112 because California case law at 
that time considered such waivers to be against public policy 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for 
Solutions to the Mystery, 23 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1989). 
 108. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., BILL ANALYSIS OF SB 78: PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENTS, S.B. 78, 2001–02 Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 2001), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/ 
01-02/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_78_cfa_20010425_100434_sen_comm.html. 
 109. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1, 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983). 
 110. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 35 (1983). 
 111. J. Thomas Oldham, Would Enactment of the Uniform Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act in All Fifty States Change U.S. Law Regarding Premarital Agreements?, 46 
FAM. L.Q. 367, 371 (2012) (“Thirteen states adopted the UPAA without modifications, while 
twelve states enacted it with modifications that almost always made it easier for a spouse to 
challenge an agreement.”). 
 112. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983) (providing 
that “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to . . . the modification or 
elimination of spousal support.”); UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 
(1983) (providing that “[i]f a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal 
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for 
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a 
court . . . may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that 
eligibility.”). But see CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 22 (“After hearing 
testimony opposing the bill’s waiver provisions on several grounds . . . the Legislature deleted the 
two provisions permitting waiver of spousal support before enacting the rest of the UPAA into 
law.”). 
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favoring the protection of marriage.113 This common-law doctrine 
was based on the assumption that “the state had a vital interest in and 
should act to ensure the permanency of the marriage relation.”114 
In Pendleton, the court recognized that “changes in the 
relationship between spouses and support obligations in 
particular . . . clearly warrant[ed] reassessment of what remains of 
the rule that premarital waivers of spousal support may promote 
dissolution and, if they do so, are unenforceable.”115 Under this 
premise, the court took a significant step toward contractual 
autonomy between spouses by lifting the blanket prohibition on 
premarital waivers of spousal support, concluding that “a premarital 
waiver of spousal support does not offend contemporary public 
policy” so long as it is “entered into voluntarily by parties who are 
aware of the effect of the agreement.”116 Justice Baxter made clear, 
however, that “[p]ublic policy continues to favor and encourage 
marriage.”117 
B.  Policy of Protecting Spousal Support 
As previously noted, when Senate Bill 78 was first introduced in 
2001, it was intended “to legislatively confirm that waivers of 
spousal support in premarital agreements are void as against public 
policy.”118 According to its author, Senator Sheila Kuehl, 
“[p]reserving spousal support as a protection against the unknown 
circumstances at the end of a marriage . . . is an important policy 
goal justifying the continued prohibition of spousal support waivers 
in premarital agreements.”119 This policy goal of preserving spousal 
support remained an important consideration even after the bill was 
amended in the Assembly to expressly permit premarital waivers of 
spousal support. 
Supporters of the amended version of Senate Bill 78, now 
 
 113. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 2 (“At that time, California case 
law considered the waiver of spousal support to be void as against public policy, because public 
policy favored the protection of marriage and the waiver of spousal support was believed to 
encourage dissolution.”). See, e.g., Barham v. Barham, 202 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1949); Whiting v. 
Whiting, 216 P. 92 (Cal. 1923). 
 114. In re Marriage of Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 847 (Cal. 2000). 
 115. Id. at 848. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 847. 
 118. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 5; see supra Part II.C.  
 119. CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 108, at 6. 
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codified as section 1612(c) of the Family Code, recognized that 
“spousal support, and the role that it can play at the time a marriage 
is ending, is worthy of some special protection.”120 That special 
protection took form as two foundational requirements that must be 
met for a spousal support waiver to be enforceable: First, the waiving 
spouse must have been represented by independent counsel at the 
time of execution.121 This provision functions as a procedural 
safeguard to ensure voluntariness at the time of execution of the 
waiver. Second, the support waiver must not be unconscionable at 
the time of enforcement.122 This provision allows courts to evaluate 
the substantive fairness of the waiver at the time enforcement is 
sought, not at the time the waiver was executed. Therefore, the 
statute gives prospective spouses contractual autonomy to modify 
their rights and obligations to each other, subject to procedural and 
substantive limitations reflecting the prevailing policy goal of 
preserving spousal support. 
C.  Public Policy Considerations in the Facter Decision 
As illustrated in the Facter decision, the unconscionability 
approach set forth by Senate Bill 78 allows courts to evaluate the 
substantive fairness of a premarital waiver of spousal support at the 
time of enforcement, even when all procedural requirements have 
been met at the time of execution of that waiver. And as explained in 
this part, the substantive review of fairness is justified by public 
policy concerns embodied in existing California law. The prevailing 
issue with the court’s decision in Facter, however, is that it neglected 
to articulate the policy considerations that justified its substantial 
review of the spousal support waiver in the premarital agreement. 
Nor did it require Nancy, the party contesting enforcement of the 
waiver, to prove that these policy concerns were existent. Instead, the 
court focused largely on Jeffrey’s net worth and earning capacity 
(and Nancy’s lack thereof) to rationalize its decision to invalidate 
Nancy’s waiver of spousal support.123 
 
 120. Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 10. 
 121. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014). 
 122. See id. 
 123. In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 93 (Ct. App. 2013). 
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V.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ENFORCEABILITY 
Since the promulgation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement 
Act (UPAA) in 1983,124 states have taken widely varying approaches 
to the enforceability of provisions in premarital agreements that limit 
or waive spousal support.125 In some states, prospective spouses have 
significant discretion to waive or limit spousal support before 
marriage. For instance, the Texas version of the UPAA omits section 
6(b),126 which gives courts discretion to decline enforcement of 
support waivers that would cause the waiving party to be eligible for 
public assistance programs.127 Similarly, non-UPAA states such as 
South Carolina and Florida have enforced spousal support waivers 
even where one party would become a public charge, so long as it 
was foreseeable for it to occur at the time of execution.128 On the 
other hand, some states, such as Iowa, South Dakota, and New 
Mexico, do not permit any modification or limitation on spousal 
support in premarital agreements.129 
In the middle of the spectrum are those states that impose 
specific limitations on enforceability of premarital waivers of spousal 
support. In Colorado, for instance, a support waiver will not be 
enforced if the waiving party would be left unable to provide for his 
or her reasonable post-divorce needs.130 Indiana considers whether 
enforcement of the waiver would result in “extreme hardship” to one 
party, while Illinois probes for any “undue hardship” arising out of 
any unforeseen change of circumstances during the marriage.131 
Several states have joined California in prohibiting enforcement of 
waivers found to be unconscionable at the time of divorce, including 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota.132 
 
 124. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). 
 125. WESTFALL ET AL., supra note 66, ¶ 11.05[1][a][i].  
 126. Id. ¶ 11.05[1][b]. 
 127. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). 
 128. J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A 
Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 110 (2011). 
 129. Id. at 87. 
 130. Id. at 123. 
 131. Id. at 124. 
 132. Id. at 87. 
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A.  The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act:  
An Incomplete Solution 
Recognizing the “significant divide” among the states as to the 
ability of courts to modify or set aside premarital agreements for 
unfairness at the time of enforcement, the Uniform Law Commission 
began promulgating the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement 
Act (UPMAA) in July of 2012.133 Its overall goal was to “produce an 
act that would promote informed decision-making and procedural 
fairness without undermining interests in contractual autonomy, 
predictability, and reliance.”134 
First, section 9(e) of the UPMAA would allow the court to 
invalidate a spousal support waiver if enforcement “causes a party to 
the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public 
assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution.”135 
Although the drafters assert that section 9(e) attempts to give 
vulnerable parties “protections far beyond what was given in the 
original Uniform Premarital Agreement Act” of 1983,136 its language 
is derived almost word for word from the spousal support waiver 
provision in the 1932 act,137 which the California Legislature already 
rejected in 1983.138 More importantly, however, Section 9(e) does 
not conform to existing public policy, given that “spousal support 
awards in California are based on the marital standard of living, not 
on an amount that would keep the supported spouse off public 
 
 133. Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital 
Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 314–15 (2012). 
 134. Id. at 315. 
 135. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(e), 9C U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2014). 
(“If a premarital agreement or marital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and the 
modification or elimination causes a party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a 
program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, on request of 
that party, may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that 
eligibility.”). 
 136. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 
2014). 
 137. Section 9(e) of the UPMAA is adapted from section 6(b) of the UPAA, which states: 
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support and 
that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for 
support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital 
dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other 
party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility. 
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). 
 138. See supra Part II.B; see also Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1245–46 (“[California] did not 
adopt wholeheartedly the ‘freedom of contract’ philosophy evinced by [the UPAA].”). 
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assistance.”139 
The second UPMAA provision, section 9(f), would allow a 
court to:  
[R]efuse . . . a term of a premarital or marital agreement if, 
in the context of the agreement as a whole: (1) the term was 
unconscionable at the time of signing; or (2) enforcement of 
the term would result in substantial hardship for a party 
because of a material change in circumstances arising after 
the agreement was signed.140 
The first part of this provision has already been incorporated in 
California law on premarital agreements.141 The second part 
resembles the approach adopted by the State of Illinois, where courts 
are permitted to order spousal support if enforcement of the support 
waiver would cause “undue hardship” to one party because of 
“circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of execution” 
of the agreement.142 The UPMAA provision, however, does not 
require that the change in circumstances was unforeseeable, but only 
that the change was “material” and that it resulted in “substantial” 
hardship. 
Although the second part of section 9(f) seems to provide a clear 
and balanced standard for determining the enforceability of a spousal 
support waiver, it neglects to consider some policy considerations 
discussed earlier. What if, for instance, Jane signed a premarital 
agreement waiving spousal support while she was unemployed, and 
she remained unemployed until the divorce twenty years later? 
Unable to find employment at fifty years old and with no assets to 
her name, Jane is likely to meet the “substantial hardship” 
requirement under section 9(f). But has there been a “material 
change in circumstances” as required by the section? Is Jane’s aging 
of twenty years a “material change?” As illustrated by this example, 
 
 139. Goldberg, supra note 34, at 1249 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 2014) (“In 
ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following 
circumstances: consider all of the following: (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each 
party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage . . . .”)). 
“[T]he major thrust of recent California spousal support legislation is to enable a former spouse to 
become self-supporting and not rely on support from either the state or an ex-spouse.” Id.  
 140. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23, (Supp. 2014). 
 141. See FAM. § 1615(a) (“A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against 
whom enforcement is sought proves . . . the agreement was unconscionable when it was 
executed . . . .”). 
 142. Oldham, supra note 128, at 110. 
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section 9(f) may not protect against a “substantial hardship” that did 
not arise out of a “material change in circumstances arising after the 
agreement was signed.”143 
As applied to Facter, this change-in-circumstances approach, by 
itself, would likely have favored enforcement of the spousal support 
waiver, contrary to the court’s ruling. There was no material change 
in circumstances apparent in Facter. Nancy quit her job before the 
marriage, and she was still unemployed at divorce sixteen years 
later.144 Even if their having a child (as they planned)145 can be 
characterized as a material change in circumstances, it would be 
difficult to argue that Nancy would experience “substantial hardship” 
after receiving $200,000, a Jaguar sedan, and half of the multi-
million-dollar home.146 The set of guidelines proposed in the 
following section incorporates this change-in-circumstances 
approach into a larger framework for determining enforceability of 
spousal support waivers in premarital agreements. 
B.  Proposed Guidelines: A Comprehensive Approach 
Subsection (c) of Family Code section 1612 states that “[a]ny 
provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support, 
including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not enforceable if . . . 
the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time 
of enforcement.”147 As previously discussed, this rule, without clear 
guidelines for determining unconscionability, allows courts to 
arbitrarily evaluate the substantive fairness of spousal support 
waivers. This author proposes two additional provisions (the 
“Guidelines”) for legislative or judicial adoption, which are adapted 
from section 7.05 of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: 
Analysis and Recommendations drafted by the American Law 
Institute.148 The bifurcated approach under the Guidelines first 
requires the party challenging enforcement to show that public policy 
concerns exist to justify the court’s substantive review of the waiver, 
 
 143. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23, (Supp. 2014). 
 144. See In re Marriage of Facter, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 84–87 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 145. Id. at 85. 
 146. Id. at 93. 
 147. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014). 
 148. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.05 CMT. A (2002). Guidelines 1 and 2 are based on subsections 2 and 3 
of section 7.05 of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. “Substantial injustice” is 
replaced with “unconscionability” and “agreement” is replaced with “waiver” in the Guidelines. 
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and then requires the court to consider a non-exhaustive set of factors 
when deciding whether or not a waiver of spousal support is 
unconscionable at the time of enforcement. 
The Guidelines provide as follows: 
(1)   A court may consider whether a provision regarding 
spousal support is unconscionable at the time of 
enforcement if, and only if, the party resisting its 
enforcement shows that one or more of the following 
have occurred since the time of the waiver’s execution: 
(a)   more than ten years have passed since the 
execution of the waiver;  
(b)   a child was born to, or adopted by, the parties;  
(c)   there has been a material change in circumstances 
that has a substantial impact on one of the parties 
or their children. 
(2)   In deciding whether a provision regarding spousal 
support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement, a 
court must consider all of the following: 
(a)   the magnitude of the disparity between the 
outcome if the waiver is enforced and the outcome 
under otherwise prevailing law; 
(b)   for those marriages of limited duration in which it 
is practical to ascertain, the difference between the 
circumstances of the objecting party if the waiver 
is enforced, and that party’s likely circumstances 
had the marriage never taken place; 
(c)   whether the purpose of the waiver was to benefit 
or protect the interests of third parties (such as 
children from a prior relationship), whether that 
purpose is still relevant, and whether the waiver’s 
terms were reasonably designed to serve it; and 
(d)   the impact of the agreement’s enforcement upon 
the children of the parties. 
The legislative or judicial consideration of these Guidelines 
would allow California courts to strike an appropriate balance 
between freedom of contract and policy considerations when 
evaluating the substantive fairness of a premarital waiver of spousal 
support. The remainder of this Article identifies the policy goals 
achieved under each part of the Guidelines and applies them to the 
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factual circumstances in Facter to illustrate that, had the court 
adopted the Guidelines, it would have arrived at the same conclusion, 
but with significantly more guidance and justification for its finding 
of unconscionability. 
1.  A Policy-Based Threshold Requirement 
Section (1) of the Guidelines operates as a threshold requirement 
that must be satisfied before the court is permitted to evaluate a 
spousal support waiver for unconscionability at the time of divorce. 
Perhaps this section of the Guidelines is the more important of the 
two, given that it effectively requires the party resisting enforcement 
to show that public policy concerns exist to warrant the court’s 
review of the substantial fairness of an otherwise valid contractual 
term. 
Only one of the three conditions under Section (1) must be 
satisfied before the court can evaluate whether a spousal support 
waiver is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. Each condition 
reflects certain policy considerations embedded in existing California 
law. For instance, subsection (a) requires that more than ten years 
have passed since the execution of the waiver. This condition is 
adapted from section 4336(b) of the Family Code, which provides 
that “[f]or the purpose of retaining jurisdiction, there is a 
presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that a 
marriage of 10 years or more, from the date of marriage to the date 
of separation, is a marriage of long duration.”149 Subsection (a) of 
the Guidelines promotes marriages of long duration and, thereby, 
conforms to the state policy in favor of marriage (and against 
dissolution). 
The condition set forth under subsection (b) is satisfied if the 
marriage produces a child, including through adoption. Underlying 
this condition is the state’s policy of protecting the interests of 
children in the marriage reflected in Family Code section 4320(g), 
which requires courts to consider “[t]he ability of the supported party 
to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the 
interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.”150  
Subsection (c) incorporates the “change-of-circumstances” 
approach under section 9(f) of the UPMAA, which allows courts to 
 
 149. FAM. § 4336(b). 
 150. Id. § 4320(g). 
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invalidate a spousal support waiver if its enforcement would lead to 
“substantial hardship for a party because of a material change in 
circumstances arising after the agreement was signed.”151 However, 
because Section (1) of the Guidelines operates as a threshold 
requirement, subsection (c) sets a lower bar than the UPMAA by 
requiring only that a “substantial impact,” rather than “substantial 
hardship,” resulted from a material change in circumstances. By 
making it easier to meet this condition, subsection (c) adheres to the 
policy goal of protecting spousal support embodied in the current 
statute.152 
2.  A Clear Set of Factors 
Section (2) of the Guidelines identifies four factors for a court to 
consider only after it has satisfied the threshold requirement under 
the first section. The factors under (2)(a) and (2)(b) attempt to 
promote the policy goal of equitable distribution by requiring courts 
to ensure that both parties share equally the benefits, and burdens, of 
the divorce153 Subsection (a) considers the magnitude of the disparity 
between the outcome if the support waiver is enforced and the 
outcome without such waiver. Under subsection (b), if the marriage 
is of limited duration (less than ten years under California law154), 
the court must consider the difference between the circumstances of 
the waiving party if the waiver is enforced, and that party’s likely 
circumstances had the marriage never taken place. 
The factors under (2)(c) and (2)(d) operate as a second layer of 
safeguards, supplementing section (1)(b) of the Guidelines, to protect 
children from the effects of a spousal support waiver. Like section 
(1)(b), these factors conform to the state policy of protecting the 
interests of children embedded in existing California law, such as 
section 4320(2)(g) of the Family Code quoted above. 
 
 151. UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f), 9C U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2014). 
 152. See Hearing on SB 78, supra note 2, at 10 (“[S]pousal support, and the role that it can 
play at the time a marriage is ending, is worthy of some special protection.”). 
 153. See Michelle Murray, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1997) (“[S]ome jurisdictions consider alimony to serve the purpose of 
supplementing or assisting with the equal or equitable division of intangible marital property.”); 
Krauskopf, supra note 107, at 256 (“[T]he purpose of court-ordered economic settlement at 
marriage dissolution is to achieve a fair sharing of the benefits and burdens of the marriage 
measurable in dollars.”). 
 154. FAM. § 4336(b). 
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C.  Applying the Guidelines to Facter 
The factual circumstances in Facter would have satisfied the 
threshold requirements under section (1) of the Guidelines, thereby 
giving the court jurisdiction to consider whether Nancy’s waiver of 
spousal support was unconscionable at the time of enforcement. The 
Facters had been married for approximately sixteen years when 
divorce proceedings were initiated,155 well over the ten-year 
benchmark in subsection (a). Additionally, their marriage produced a 
son,156 which satisfies subsection (b). 
Also, had the Facter court considered the factors set forth in 
section (2) of the Guidelines, the court would likely have reached the 
same decision to refuse to enforce the spousal support waiver. For 
instance, section (2)(a) incorporates the court’s mathematical 
approach in Facter. Judge Marguilles calculated the total amount that 
Nancy would have received had the waiver been enforced, and then 
compared it to the amount of Jeffrey’s assets and annual income.157 
As required under section (2)(a) of the Guidelines, the court 
considered the magnitude of disparity between the outcome if the 
waiver was enforced and the outcome without the waiver, concluding 
that “[c]ompared to what [Nancy] is likely to receive in court-
ordered spousal support, these assets are manifestly inadequate.”158  
As to section (2)(b) of the Guidelines, the court considered the 
difference between the circumstances if the agreement was enforced 
and the circumstances if the marriage had never taken place. Instead 
of “pursu[ing] her education or seek[ing] gainful employment,” 
Nancy “devoted her efforts to child rearing and maintaining the 
family home, while Jeffrey continued to successfully pursue a 
financially rewarding career.”159 Thus under the Guidelines, the 
court would have similarly concluded that if the spousal support 
waiver was enforced, “Nancy will never come close to replicating 
the marital standard of living.”160 
Although the court did not consider whether the Facters’ 
agreement was intended or designed to benefit or protect third parties 
 
 155. The parties were married in 1994 and separated in 2010. In re Marriage of Facter, 152 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 156. Id. at 83 (“The marriage produced a son, who was born in March 1996.”). 
 157. See id. at 93. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 92. 
 160. Id. at 93. 
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(section 2(c) of the Guidelines), doing so would only have supported 
the court’s decision to refuse enforcement of the support waiver. 
Jeffrey was simply “afraid of marriage because he had worked hard 
all his life and had earned a lot of money, and wanted all that he had 
earned prior to marriage to be protected” and “did not want to have 
any continuing financial obligations to [Nancy] if their marriage 
ended.”161 He did not intend for the agreement to protect any third-
parties. Nancy had two children from a prior marriage162 that ended 
with disputes regarding support and attorney fees.163 It would be 
difficult to argue, however, that Nancy intended to protect or benefit 
her two children by agreeing to waive her rights to spousal support. 
Therefore, the court’s consideration of this section 2(c) of the 
Guidelines would have weighed in favor of non-enforcement. 
The Facter court did not expressly consider the impact of the 
enforcement on Nancy and Jeffrey’s son. However, the court 
acknowledged the fact that Nancy intended to be a “stay-at-home 
mom”164 to “devote her efforts to child rearing and maintaining the 
family home,”165 and that she “will never come close to replicating 
the marital standard of living” if the spousal support waiver were 
enforced.166 As such, it can be inferred that Nancy’s marital standard 
of living included adequate and proper care for their son, which, 
according to the court, would certainly be affected by enforcement of 
the agreement. Therefore, had the court considered the effect of 
enforcement on Jeffery and Nancy’s son, as required in Guideline 
2(d), it would still have likely concluded that enforcement of waiver 
would be unconscionable. 
Had the Court of Appeals in Facter applied the Guidelines 
proposed by this author, not only would the court have reached the 
same decision (that Nancy’s waiver of spousal support was 
unconscionable at the time of enforcement), the court would have set 
forth a clear, policy-based approach to determining unconscionability 
within the meaning of section 1612(c) of the Family Code. 
 
 161. Id. at 85–86. 
 162. See id. at 84. 
 163. Id. at 86 n.11 (“Nancy testified that her previous marriage had lasted for eight years. 
When she got divorced, she and her former husband went through the court system. During the 
proceedings, there were disputes regarding support and attorney fees.”). 
 164. Id. at 85. 
 165. Id. at 92. 
 166. Id. at 93. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
California courts and the Legislature have an opportunity to 
clarify an ambiguity in its existing family law. Section 1612(c) of the 
Family Code prohibits enforcement of premarital waivers of spousal 
support that are “unconscionable at the time of enforcement,”167 but 
it remains unclear what this phrase actually means. Without a clear 
standard for determining what makes a support waiver 
unconscionable, courts have unrestricted and unguided jurisdiction to 
evaluate the substantial fairness of a private, contractual term 
between spouses. The judicial or legislative adoption of the 
Guidelines proposed by this author would strike an appropriate 
balance between freedom of contract and the policies embodied in 
existing family law. 
 
 
 
 167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2014). 
